The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC// Rev.4, provides recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear. physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities infcirc revision 5. English STI/PUB/; (ISBN); 57 pp.; € ; Date. INFCIRC/ has been updated several times, the current version being INFCIRC//Rev Revision 4 is undergoing a major revision, and.
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The Convention does not provide for inspections. From 3 to 14 Marchthe group of legal and technical experts held infvirc last meeting to prepare its recommendation on a well-defined amendment to the Convention.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) | Treaties & Regimes | NTI
This may appear similar to the DBT definition, but it is more flexible and potentially less resource-intensive, as it allows flexibility in the type of information used and does not require defined adversary attributes and characteristics. They suggested that the Agency should consider the possibility of convening a meeting of interested States to address the issues involved in such a review.
First, there is the new recommendation, related to reducing categories for “self protecting” highly radioactive material, that assessments of threats consider adversaries that may be willing to die to accomplish their mission. The Second Working Group meeting, convened on June, discussed five working papers related to the competency of the five working sub-groups established at the first meeting. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at press conference, 30 April – usun.
The document encouraged participating states to work towards universality where applicable, early implementation of the amendment and assist states with implementation. The meeting participants decided to establish five working sub-groups on different related matters, including illicit trafficking and physical protection assistance. Delegations from member states discussed long terms safety issues and the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan.
Once the NSS is completed it should become the standard set of nuclear security guidelines adopted by facilities around the world. The new rules dictated by the amendments will come into effect once two-thirds of the States Parties to the convention ratify the changes.
This review was initiated for a combination of reasons: The meeting focused on the implementation and entry into force of the amendment. Conclusions While nuclear security’s profile has recently taken centre stage viz. Rather, it gives credit to general site fences already commonly found at facilities and ensures that protected area boundaries are not freely accessible to the public.
Whether Revision 5 is sustainable in the long term when future developments of this document and the NSS are considered, will be discussed below.
It was agreed that in case of sufficient support for such a meeting, it would be convened in The Australian Passport Office and its agents are committed to providing a secure, efficient and responsive passport service for Australia. Australia’s economic and commercial diplomacy What is economic and commercial diplomacy? This was the largest gathering of world leaders convened by a US president since the end of World War II 1and resulted in an outcomes document with several important undertakings on securing nuclear materials.
The subject of nuclear security or, in the parlance of the nuclear industry, physical protection has taken on greater prominence over the last ten years since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September demonstrated the willingness of terrorist groups to escalate to new scales of mass destruction.
Introduction The subject of nuclear security or, in the parlance of the nuclear industry, physical protection has taken on greater prominence over the last ten years since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September demonstrated the willingness of terrorist groups to escalate to new scales of mass destruction. In June, the IAEA Director General distributed the Final Report to the States Parties urging them to work rapidly towards consensus on the text in order to have a Diplomatic Conference to adopt the proposed amendments at an early date.
Treaties Treaty making process. This reflects the fact that the fundamentals in Revision 4 were sound, and in particular the provision on using design basis threats DBTs in designing security systems gave the flexibility necessary for accommodating a full range of threats. Soft Power Review Ensuring Australia continues to build soft power and exercise influence effectively.
Revision 5 was not all about harmonisation, it was also important to modernise the 2225 to reflect contemporary threats such as terrorism and industry practices. This solution is not ideal either as it could create difficulties of competing parallel standards.
Eleven States ratified or officially accepted the amendment: Four States became parties infcircc the Convention: Significantly, it made clearer distinctions between requirements to protect against unauthorised removal and against sabotage, including a new chapter on sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. Travel advice for countries and events. Home About us Publications. 225 the meeting, the participants anticipated concluding the draft, but failed to agree on the methodology to incorporate Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection in the draft and the scope of sabotage and question of sanction for its environmental damage related to the international commission.
The provisions contained within the CPPNM are high level and focussed primarily on what nuclear material to protect and what to reportrather than how to protect, and is primarily limited to international transport.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
The Work Plan from the Summit identified the Convention and its amendment as the only multilateral, legally binding agreement regarding the physical protection of nuclear material in peaceful uses.
The term nuclear security is used here, rather than physical protection, as the nuclear security series goes beyond protection of nuclear material to protection of all radiological materials. States Parties must identify and make known to each other directly or through the IAEA their central authority and point of contact having responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material and for coordinating recovery and response operations in the event of any unauthorized removal, use, or alteration of nuclear material or in the event of a credible threat thereof.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. This structure is outlined in the following figure. Verification and Compliance Verification States Parties must identify and make known to each other directly or through the IAEA their central authority and point of contact having responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material and for coordinating recovery and response operations in the event of any unauthorized removal, use, or alteration of nuclear material or in the event of a credible threat thereof.
The amended CPPNM legally binds states to the protection of nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage, and transport. Nuclear Security Fundamentals containing objectives, concepts and principles of nuclear security and the basis for nuclear security recommendations; Nuclear Security Recommendations presenting best practices to adopt in the application of the Fundamentals; and Implementing Guidelines and Technical Guidance documents providing elaboration on implementation and technical details relevant to the Recommendations.
Seven States ratified or officially accepted the amendment: The document considered the Convention an essential element of the nuclear security architecture. Revision 5 qualifies this re-categorisation provision by stating that “if the threat assessment or [DBT] includes an adversary who is willing to die to accomplish their mission, States should carefully consider whether or not to reduce the categorization levels of the material on the basis of radiation levels sufficient to incapacitate the adversary before the malicious act is completed” emphasis added.
The meeting considered proposals by the United Kingdom, France Germany, Belgium, and Sweden to look more broadly at the question. Twelve States ratified or officially accepted the amendment: About The CPPNM is the only legally binding international agreement focusing on the physical protection of peaceful use nuclear materials. However, the prepared text still contained a number of bracketed clauses on which the group was not able to reach agreement.
It adopted a Final Report, in which the working group recommended the strengthening of the existing Convention by a well-defined amendment that would cover, among other topics, domestic use, storage and transport of nuclear material with the exclusion of nuclear material and nuclear facilities for military use, mandatory international oversight, periodic national reporting, peer reviews, and mandatory use of.
One of the recommendations was that the Amendment should include a statement of Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles. Several States Parties, including Argentina, Belarus, China, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, and Turkey, declared that they were not bound by the provision of Article 17, paragraph 2, which provides for the submission of disputes to arbitration or their referral to the International Court of Justice in the case of an inability to resolve the dispute on the basis of negotiations between the States Parties.
The Convention also promotes international cooperation in the exchange of physical protection information. Given the increased profile of terrorism in national security planning over the last ten years, many nuclear facilities likely already factor this type of threat into physical protection systems.