Dharmakirti on the Duality of the Object: Pramanavarttika III (Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Sud- und Zentralasiens) [Eli Franco, Miyako. : Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (Parathanumana): 1 (Veroffentlichungen Zu Den Sprachen Und. Japan’s largest platform for academic e-journals: J-STAGE is a full text database for reviewed academic papers published by Japanese societies.
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The idea of a logical reason being sesavat means that it is suspected to be present in both similar and dissimilar instances, as in the usual Dharmaklrtian examples of fallacious proofs that someone is or is not omniscient because he pfamanavarttika seen to use language or that he has desire because he has a body. The first chapter with the autocommentary.
Dharmakīrti (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Because universal properties [like being an object of a means of valid cognition, etc. The opponent is seeking to establish a parallel between the case prsmanavarttika the antinomic reason being fallacious and the case oL krtakatva proving a property i.
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There is no difference whether the subject is under discussion or not. Probably the Carvaka’s initial strategy, depicted in k.
The PVV provides the following introduction to k. PVV analyzes the compound as a bahuvrihi qualifying svayam- srutim. The Buddhist Epistemologists are, in effect, to borrow an idea of Donald Davidsonsubscribers to a rigid separation between a conceptual scheme and a perceptual content free from the scheme’s additions and distortions, and their problem then becomes how to bridge that very scheme-content gap so that thought and language are still somehow about reality.
Read bde ba mi ‘grub following P. He begins by introducing verse 34 as follows:. To bring out the problem, take the following tempting, but invalid, inference: Thus, Dharmaklrti and his commentators phrase the opponent’s argument in terms of both schemata. First of all, who was Dharmakirti’s interlocutor?
Pramanavarttika – Wikipedia
Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Thus, the classic illustration of this form is “Whatever is produced is impermanent, like a vase.
Chinchore – – Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary s. PVV, 1: Therefore, even if it [i. The argument turns on the fact that a dharmin is a particular, rather than a dharmakirri, and hence that it cannot qualify any dharmakiryi entity.
Indeed his causal theory of properties allows him to assert that fire, being what it is, must cause smoke under the right conditions and smoke, being smoke, must be caused by fire.
Thus the following is asserted: A sense perception establishes and falsifies, not because it is in itself propositional xharmakirti, but because of the simple fact that it exists and does actually apprehend its corresponding particular.
Indeed, if it were a false statement, the point in question would not be conveyed. This will be explained more fully below. Such is what is expressed by the [words ‘his own subject’]. A distinction is made between three sorts of objects: PV Tib bsgrub mams la.
Regarding the phrase sato ‘pi: Then we would have to translate: Ikog gyur dag la. For indeed it was not due to a fault in his statement that the [reason] came to invalidate the treatise. Following Bu ston’s commentary on PVin, the dharmakigti here is a Mimamsaka. Thus the word svayam himself is ineffectual. Now, it is not so that words, which function purely by agreement, fail to apply anywhere. Thus, the restrictions which pramanavatrtika imposes would become pointless.
Secondly, and perhaps more decisively, the kinds or universals that we pramaavarttika and talk about are not features of the particulars themselves but are merely fictions.
For, it is when simple impermanence is refuted that there is a fault. Hence Dhar- maldrti’s statement in k.
Now, an entity is capable of being the intended designatum of a [given] word. That restriction on the reason, to be legitimate, should have ensured the implication of the property “having an anterior recitation,” but in fact there is nothing at all contradictory in some or another recitation of the Veda not having an anterior recitation.
It is only after criteria a and b have been satisfied that one may proceed to c —this is the point of k. Abhidharma Indian Philosophy Classical: Text and critical notes. After all, he himself had just argued extensively in k.